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Introduction 
      The spirit of the political life of the United States has been portrayed as a hegemonic 
liberal consensus.1 In turn, criticism of this consensualist thesis high-lighted the 
importance of republicanism in American political history.2 Debate among contemporary 
political philosophers is still caught in this to and fro of liberal assertion and republican 
counter. Since 1971, the prime mover of debate among North American political 
philosophers has been John Rawls. His most recent work Political Liberalism attempts to 
apply the liberal doctrine of toleration to philosophy itself. His radically constructivist 
theory attempts to develop a `political' conception of justice with minimal dependence on 
moral and metaphysical presuppositions. It is Rawls's hope that, thus politicized, the 
conception of justice will be acceptable to citizens of diverse and conflicting moral, 
religious and philosophical views, in his terms, will become the focus of an overlapping 
consensus of comprehensive doctrines.3 Conceived as acceptable to a plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines but grounded in no specific doctrine, Rawls's political 
conception of justice is thus an interpretation of liberal neutrality and promises a glorious 
synthesis of social cooperation and individual freedom.  
      Michael Sandel, in his fascinating Democracy's Discontent, presents the republican 
antiphon to Rawls's liberal canticle. Sandel portrays an anxious America whose 
politicians cannot respond to the two most prominent fears of the age, fears over the 
erosion of community and the loss of self-government. His purpose in writing 
Democracy's Discontent is to show "how the inability of the reigning political agenda to 
                                                
1 Cf. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1948) and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 
Inc., 1955). 
2 Cf. Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1953). J.G.A 
Pocock, The Machiavelli Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Gordon Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). Bernard 
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) Lecture IV. 
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address the erosion of the community reflects the impoverished conception of citizenship 
and freedom implicit in our public life." 4 
      Sandel argues that the root of the problem lies in America's Rawlsian public 
philosophy. On his view public philosophy is: "the political theory implicit in our 
practice, the assumptions about citizenship and freedom that inform our public life."5 
According to Sandel, America's public philosophy is rooted in its conception of freedom. 
With extensive historical detail and some broad brush strokes, he portrays American 
political history as the gradual transition from a public political philosophy grounded in a 
republican conception of freedom, to contemporary practice which is grounded in a 
Rawlsian liberal view.  
      Whereas republicans conceive freedom in terms of self-government, liberals conceive 
freedom in terms of voluntarism. The republican holds that individual freedom must be 
achieved through communal political activity; through deliberation on the common good 
and concern for public affairs. On this view an individual receives the content of his 
freedom, the range of choices available to him and his hierarchy of goals, through 
participation in the community. By contrast, on Sandel's account, the liberal conceives 
freedom as the capacity to choose one's ends. A quotation from Rawls gives clear 
expression to this conception. He states that individuals: "do not think of themselves as 
inevitably bound to, or as identical with, the pursuit of any particular complex of 
fundamental interests that they may have at any given time, although they want the right 
to advance such interests (provided they are admissible). Rather, free persons conceive of 
themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who give first priority 
to preserving their liberty in those matters."6  
      These conceptions of freedom have significant implications for republican and liberal 
accounts of the role of government in individuals' pursuits of the good life. Republican 
politics has a distinctively formative component. It wishes to educate citizens in the civic 
virtues required for self-government. It wishes to inform and reform the character of 
citizens to enable them to participate more fully in the good life as defined by communal 
political deliberation.7 Sandel promotes the dispersal of political sovereignty to the 
localized communities in which citizens are embedded and through which they learn to 
participate in a common public life. Liberal politics, by contrast, focusses on the capacity 
of individuals to form and revise their conception of the good. According to Sandel, it 
thus remains neutral as to the goods which individuals pursue. The liberal state does not 
support any one comprehensive conception of the good life but allows individuals to 
choose their own conceptions provided these are just. Sandel contends that this view of 
politics is embodied in the Supreme Court whose interest in the protection of individual 
rights is destructive of particular communities.  
                                                
4 Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) p. 3, 323. 
5 Sandel 1996: 4. 
6 John Rawls, "Reply to Alexander and Musgrave", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88/4, p.641. 
7 Sandel 1996: 7. 
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      Taken together, voluntarism and its implication for the public conception of the good, 
that is, neutrality, are the fundamental tenets of what Sandel calls the procedural republic. 
He argues that the liberal public philosophy holds that: "government should not affirm in 
law any particular vision of the good life. Instead it should provide a framework of rights 
that respects persons as free and independent selves capable of choosing their own values 
and ends." Further he states: "Since this liberalism asserts the priority of fair procedures 
over particular ends, the public life it informs might be called the procedural republic."8  
      According to Sandel, John Rawls has articulated the most explicit contemporary 
defense of the procedural republic.9 Rawls argues that the free exercise of public reason 
in a liberal democracy has as its result a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
of the good life. Rawls accepts the importance these doctrines have in the lives of 
individuals, indeed he sees them as crucial to individual identity. Nevertheless, he argues 
that individuals are not bound to any particular comprehensive view and must have the 
freedom to revise their views. Further, because citizens recognize that it is reasonable to 
disagree on moral and religious views, they will not expect the state to enforce their own 
preferred view.  
      On Rawls's view, the state must be neutral among comprehensive views in at least 
two ways: (1) The state's legitimacy is grounded in a political conception which is the 
focus of an overlapping consensus. The political conception is thus neutral in that it can 
be the basis of agreement among even conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines; it 
is agreeable to all. (2) The basic institutions and public policy grounded in the political 
conception are not designed to further any particular comprehensive view; public 
agreement is not based on, for example, a conception of the common good.10  
      According to Rawls, it follows that for citizens to engage in just public deliberation 
about constitutional essentials, they must be able to argue on the basis of what he calls 
public reason: common political presuppositions, uncontroversial evidence, and common 
forms of argument acceptable within the political conception. Thus, as Sandel contends, 
the Rawlsian view: "depends on the plausibility of separating politics from philosophy, of 
bracketing moral and religious questions where politics is concerned."11  
     Sandel's historical investigations intend to demonstrate that: "a political conception of 
justice must sometimes presuppose an answer to the moral and religious question it 
purports to bracket. At least where grave moral questions are at stake, it is not possible to 
detach politics from substantive moral judgment."12 Further he wishes to indicate that the 
historical predominance of the liberal attempt to create a public political realm exclusive 
of moral and religious argument impoverishes political discourse and erodes civic virtue 
                                                
8 Sandel 1996: 4. 
9 Sandel 1996: 290. Sandel characterizes Rawls view as "minimalist liberalism". Sandel 1996: 17-19. 
10 Rawls 1993: 192. 
11 Sandel 1996: 19. 
12 Sandel 1996: 23. 
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and the capacity for self-government. Sandel offers his version of civic republicanism as 
a correction and enrichment of the malaise of liberal public culture.  
     This essay investigates Sandel's account of two crucial events in American history, the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates during the 1858 senate campaign in Illinois (which set out the 
theoretical bases of the war against slavery) and the New Deal. The Lincoln-Douglas 
debates give historical support to Sandel's criticism of neutrality. A more thorough 
analysis than he provides suggests both the pervasiveness of Lincoln's moral 
interpretation of the evil of slavery and the substantive interests served by Douglas's 
apparent neutrality. However, Sandel's account of the Civil War and his criticism of 
neutrality is weakened by his failure adequately to recognize the important role played by 
William Lloyd Garrison as the moral gadfly of abolitionism. Further, Sandel's neglect of 
significant republican elements in the New Deal weakens his overall account of 
American history and of the ethical unity of individual and community which is its base.  
     Sandel's account of American history is thus one-sided. While he recognizes that both 
liberal and republican conceptions of freedom have been present throughout American 
history, he nevertheless focuses on the displacement of republicanism by liberalism: 
"Broadly speaking, republicanism predominated earlier in American history, liberalism 
later."13 This abstract focus on the progressive ascendancy of liberalism has two 
significant results. First, Sandel's account of the Civil Rights movement, what he calls, 
"the finest expression of republican politics in our time," is weakened.14 Without 
recognition of the republican elements in the New Deal, a serious lacuna is present in any 
account of the development of Black civic-engagement. The national interest in civil 
rights did not suddenly emerge in 1954 with Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka 
or in the 1960's with the moral eloquence of Martin Luther King. 15The New Deal of the 
1930's helped politicize Blacks and involved them in government on a national scale.  
     Second, Sandel's criticism of Rawls is weakened. Sandel's history exhibits a profound 
republican moment in the constitution and public culture of the United States which gives 
force to his criticism of Rawls's conception of public reason, by indicating the 
inadequacy of the Rawlsian conception to give a comprehensive account of the public 
culture of the United States. However, so far as this republican element is portrayed as 
thoroughly supplanted by liberalism, its relevance to contemporary public culture is 
obscured. Sandel's attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of Rawls's conception of public 
reason to comprehend the political culture of the United States would be greatly 
                                                
13 Sandel 1996: 6. 
14 Sandel's account would be strengthened by further examination of the civil rights movement. But the 
criticism I make here is not that he does not provide an adequate account of the civil rights movement but 
that he cannot because he neglects the republican origins of this movement in the New Deal. 
15 Brown v. the Board of Education consolidated under one name a group of cases, all of which challenged 
the `separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. In the decision Chief Justice Earl Warren stated: 
"Segregation of white and coloured children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the coloured 
children" for it "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may effect their 
hearts and their minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
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strengthened if he more fully indicated the presence of civic republicanism in 
contemporary public life and political institutions.  
     Third, Sandel thus only partially represents both the ethical core of the American spirit 
and the malaise of contemporary American society. This malaise is more precisely 
described as an overemphasis of the liberal moment of its public culture. Its correction is 
to be found not simply in the reassertion of republican values but in a theoretical and 
practical recognition of the mutual integrity of its liberal and republican moments. This 
fundamental reciprocity and unity, and the political struggle to recognize and instantiate 
this, is the lesson of the epochal events of American history. The Civil War indicates that 
the ethical community in its totality, the Union, is prior to and authoritative over the more 
particular interests of states (in succession) and individuals (in `property', i.e, slaves). 
However, the authoritative power of the Union flies the banner of freedom, its activity 
instantiates subjective freedom and is its objective ground.  
     The post-Civil War growth of capitalism creates a civil society opposed in part to the 
agrarian ethical order of Jeffersonian America. Whereas the ethical life of the country 
rests on nature and family, civil society replaces these bonds with an order constituted by 
the aggregation of individual interests. The institutions characteristic of civil society, 
corporations and the `night-watchman' state, presuppose a universal moral principle 
common to agrarian life, generally the Protestant work ethic. However, this principle 
does not receive clear institutional expression as in the case of an established religion; the 
principle of the sanctity of the individual conscience prohibits the establishment of 
religion. Rather the individual is now the locus of this ethic and the institutions of civil 
society have as their end the security and protection of property and personal freedom.  
     Implicit in the New Deal, however, is a recognition of the limits of an order founded 
on mere self-interest, and the assertion of a common good with authority over the 
divisions of individual and of class. Though American political thought still wrestles with 
the form which this common good can take in a pluralist society, the presence of a 
common good appears in such developments as the increased participation of Blacks in 
political life - in the increase among Blacks of what Hegel calls "self-determining action 
on laws and principles".16  
 
I. Public Reason And Moral Principle: The Lincoln-Douglas Debates  
1. The Limits of Bracketing Moral Controversies  
     Sandel's account of the Lincoln-Douglas debates focuses on whether it was proper to 
bracket the dispute over slavery in order to preserve the stability of the Union. He states: 
"The debate between Lincoln and Douglas was primarily about whether to bracket a 
                                                
16 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Tr. T.M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967) p. 156. 
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moral controversy for the sake of political agreement."17 The central thrust of Sandel's 
interpretation of the debate shows how the type of neutrality embodied in the procedural 
republic is inadequate to important moral issues. Sandel draws on the ethical and 
symbolic position which Lincoln occupies in the public culture of the United States. He 
points to Lincoln as an archetypal political figure whose greatness consists precisely in 
his moral argument, in his criticism of neutrality. Time after time in his debates with 
Douglas, Lincoln attacks the presuppositions of neutrality. For example: [Of Douglas's 
indifference] "I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it 
because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world..."18 Also: "Is 
it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon the basis 
of caring nothing about the very thing that everybody does care the most about?"19  
     Lincoln, however, was not an abolitionist. He thought that the immediate 
emancipation of all slaves would cause untold suffering and instability. Nor did he 
support radical integration of the races. He argued, for example, that just because he 
believed in freedom and equality for the Negro, this didn't mean he would like to marry 
one.20 George Fredrickson offers a judicious reading of Lincoln's view of Black people: 
"For Lincoln the Negro was a man - to alter the abolitionist battle cry - but not a 
brother."21 Yet Lincoln fought for the ultimate extinction of slavery, believing that the 
Union could not maintain a balance between the two positions and that slavery was a 
grave moral evil. In his famous `house-divided' speech he states: "Either the opponents of 
slavery,[sic] will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall 
rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it 
forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new -- North as 
well as South."22  
     Sandel's argument is strengthened upon recognition of the pervasiveness of Lincoln's 
moral commitment in the climate of the time. Not only did Lincoln quote Scripture and 
assert Christian principles, but his assertions in the context of the 1850's represent a 
controversial interpretation of Christianity. As Saul Sigelschiffer contends, in 1844: 
"Southern clergy men could not accept the position that slavery was evil and un-
Christian.... The Southern Methodists now withdrew from the national church and formed 
their own Methodist Episcopal Church South. A similar schism soon followed in the 
Baptist and Presbyterian Churches."23 This bolsters Sandel's general portrayal of the 
interrelationship between morality and politics. Lincoln's assertions went two ways, so to 
speak. On the one hand, he drew on Christian principles to support his `political' 
argument against slavery; on the other hand, his political position implicitly took sides on 
                                                
17 Sandel 1996: 22. 
18 Roy P. Basler, (ed), Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, (Cleveland: The World Publishing 
Co., 1981) p.291. 
19 Quoted in Sandel 1996: 23. 
20 Saul Sigelschiffer, The American Conscience: The Drama of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (New York: 
Horizon, 1973) p. 281. 
21 George R. Fredrickson, The Arrogance of Race (Wesleyan: Wesleyan University Press 1988) p. 68. 
22 Basler 1981: 372-3. 
23 Sigelschiffer 1973: 26. 
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the substantive `theological' question of whether or not Christian doctrine legitimized 
slavery.  
     A broader account of the debate than Sandel himself gives provides even further 
evidence for his claims about the limits of neutrality. First, Douglas's belief in neutrality 
presupposes a moral commitment. Though Douglas wished to bracket moral beliefs at the 
federal level, this was based on his prior allegiance to popular sovereignty, at the level of 
state or territory. Moreover, implicit in Douglas's position are two conflicting notions of 
what it means to "bracket".24 On the first interpretation the federal government allows 
each territory to decide for itself whether to enter the Union slave or free. This is 
indicated by Douglas's support for the Kansas-Nebraska Act. On the second 
interpretation, the federal government respects the right of each individual to decide 
whether or not to own slaves. This is indicated by his support of Dred Scott.25 Thus 
Douglas's substantive adherence to popular sovereignty supports not only his concept of 
neutrality but also his interpretation of bracketing.  
     Second, in context, neutrality can be used by political interests to further their own 
non-neutral agendas. As Lincoln observed, bracketing moral concerns and accepting the 
judgment of the court in Dred Scott implied the extension of slavery, which was the 
stated desire of the slave-owners. He accused Douglas of this subterfuge: "This declared 
indifference, but, as I must think, covert real zeal for the spread of slavery, I can not but 
hate."26 But this does not seem entirely fair to Douglas. While on Lincoln's view Dred 
Scott ensconced the individual right to slavery as against both federal and state 
government, Douglas, in fact, interpreted Dred Scott in terms of territorial sovereignty. In 
a letter to a friend, J.B. Dorr, he states that he would not accept the Democratic 
nomination for president if the policy of the party: "either establishes or prohibits slavery 
in the Territory beyond the power of the people legally to control it, as other property."27  
     Moreover, this is the interpretation the Southern wing of the Democratic Party gave to 
Douglas's view. In a speech which presaged a split in the Democratic Party and in which 
the radical South denounced Douglas, Senator Judah P. Benjamin from Louisiana stated: 
"We accuse him of this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point upon which 
we were at issue, that it should be considered a judicial point; that he would abide the 
decision; that he would act under the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that 
having said that to us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a local 
                                                
24 Sandel misses this point and recognizes only the first alternative. For further discussion of the need for 
substantive doctrines in determining the mode of bracketing cf. Sandel's discussion of Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians. Sandel 1996: 102. 
25 The notorious Dred Scott decision, as Sandel notes, was the only time prior to the Civil War that the 
Supreme Court enforced the Bill of Rights against an act of Congress (Sandel 1996: 38-9). Dred Scott was 
a slave who sued in court for his freedom. Three cases in Missouri upheld the rights of Scott's owner. In 
February of 1856 the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford was argued before the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The Supreme Court likewise upheld the property rights of Scott's owner. Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 
U.S. 393 (1856). Cf. below for further discussion. 
26 Basler 1981: 291. 
27 Sigelschiffer 1973: 391-2. 
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election, his knees gave way; his whole person trembled .... his success in the canvass for 
the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the loss of the Presidency of the 
United States"28  
     Though Douglas's own views can be distinguished from those of Benjamin, Lincoln 
convincingly demonstrated that Douglas served the interest of the slave-owners. Lincoln 
considered the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Dred Scott decision as an "almost complete 
legal combination" as a "piece of machinery so to speak".29 He states: "The working 
points of that machinery are: First that no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and 
no descendant of such slave can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term 
used in the Constitution of the United States.... Secondly that `subject to the Constitution 
of the United States' neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery 
from any United States Territory.... Thirdly, that whether the holding a negro in actual 
slavery in a free State,[sic] makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts 
will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State the Negro 
may be forced into by the master.... Auxiliary to all this and working hand in hand with it, 
the Nebraska doctrine or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion, at least 
Northern public opinion, to not care whether slavery is voted down or voted up."30  
     Douglas did not see the conflict between his concept of territorial sovereignty and 
Dred Scott's instantiation of a universal individual right to own slaves. But Lincoln 
clearly realized that if the implications of Dred Scott were played out, the only role 
territorial sovereignty could play was democratically to support the slave trade. If citizens 
voted against the slave trade they would be contradicting the rights of the individual 
which, under Dred Scott, were protected by the Supreme Court.  
     Third, the relation of the constitution to the slave trade supports Sandel's claim that a 
neutralist republic cannot contain the moral energies of the people and cannot engage 
them in debate and criticism.31 A look at how the South overturned the intentions of the 
framers of the Constitution is instructive. It can be argued that the framers of the 
Constitution intended that slavery die out.32 Nevertheless, in spite of this opposition to 
slavery, within the confines of constitutional neutrality, a vociferous minority in the south 
stretched the boundaries of slavery on all fronts.  
     It can be argued moreover that with Dred Scott, the Constitution had been hijacked by 
southern interests. Five of the judges hailed from the South and a "heavy correspondence 
                                                
28 Many Southerners broke away from the party and nominated their own candidate, John C. Breckenridge 
of Kentucky. Sigelschiffer 1973: 408. 
29 Basler 1981: 37. 
30 Basler 1981: 375-6. 
31 Sandel 1996: 24. 
32 Three aspects support this interpretation: (1) Article 1,9,11 which prohibits the slave trade after the year 
1808, the least ambiguous evidence; (2) the political injunctions against slavery in the territories (e.g., the 
Ordinance of 1787) and; (3) Lincoln's analysis of the voting habits of the framers, perhaps the most 
ambiguous evidence. Cf. "The Cooper Institute Address", Basler 1981: 517-39. 
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passed between leaders and judges".33 As Sigelschiffer indicates, there was an exchange 
of letters between President-elect Buchanan and Justice Grier.34 In fact, two weeks before 
his inauguration, Grier wrote Buchanan: "I will give you in confidence the history of the 
case before us with the probable result ... there will therefore be six, if not seven (perhaps 
Nelson will remain neutral) who will decide the Compromise law of 1820 to be of non-
effect."35 Further, on March 4, in his inaugural address, Buchanan stated that he would 
"cheerfully submit" to whatever the Court decided. On March 6 the Court rendered its 
judgment by a vote of 7-2, Justice Taney arguing: (1) that Negroes were not citizens, (2) 
that the Constitution didn't include them as citizens; and (3) that the Missouri 
Compromise was void.36 The Dred Scott decision effectively eliminated the constitutional 
and political bulwarks against the spread of slavery, and this on the basis of the individual 
rights of the slave-holder.  
     The official doctrine of neutrality thus left the slave owners outside the corrective 
influence of democratic debate and provided the moral space for more nefarious activities 
in the support of their own interests. This form of toleration leaves prejudices intact and 
allows them to fester in private life, ultimately spilling over into the political arena.  
     Historical interrogation of the Lincoln-Douglas debates thus supports Sandel's 
criticism of the political conception of neutrality in a number of ways: the historical 
stature of Lincoln indicates the political pedigree of reference to comprehensive 
doctrines; Douglas's view shows how neutrality presupposes moral commitment; and the 
growth of slavery shows that a politics of neutrality cannot correct the perverse moral 
energies of its citizens.  
2. Rawlsian Public Reason and the Lincoln-Douglas Debate  
     In light of his analysis of the Lincoln-Douglas debates and the moral critique of 
slavery, Sandel criticizes Rawls's suggestion that his political conception of public reason 
is compatible with the moral critique and actions which ended slavery. Rawls argues that 
his view of public reason permits citizens to present the comprehensive basis of their 
political values provided that there is division in the society about constitutional 
essentials or about the application of principles of justice, and provided that they do this 
in ways that strengthen the idea of public reason.37 He points to the abolitionist movement 
as a paradigm for reference to comprehensive doctrines. He argues that, although they 
referred to their comprehensive doctrines, "they could have seen their actions as the best 
way to bring about a well-ordered and just society in which the ideal of public reason 
could eventually be honoured."38 So, for Rawls, because they "could" have thought that 
                                                
33 Sigelschiffer 1973: 49. 
34 (Sigelschiffer 1973: 49). 
35 Sigelschiffer 1973: 49. 
36 Sigelschiffer 1973: 50. 
37 Rawls 1993: 251. 
38 Rawls 1993: 251. 
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the reasons they referred to, though comprehensive, were required to strengthen the 
political conception to be subsequently realized, they did not contravene public reason.  
     Sandel rightly argues, however, that in the absence of extraordinary assumptions, it is 
difficult to interpret the abolitionist argument as consistent with the ideal of public reason 
advanced by political liberalism. What is more likely, he contends, is that abolitionists 
were hoping to get Americans to extend religious and moral reasoning to other issues.39 
Sandel concludes that Rawls cannot account for why Lincoln was right and Douglas 
wrong in 1858.  
     Sandel's account of Rawls's attempted appropriation of Lincoln and the abolitionists is 
persuasive. Rawls underestimates the significance of the fact that neither Lincoln nor the 
abolitionists were motivated by the intention of strengthening public reason. Moreover, in 
like circumstances it would be impossible to judge whether one's actions will, in the end, 
strengthen public reason. On what grounds could it have been predicted that the 
bloodshed and division of war would lead to an harmonious consensus on public reason, 
from what standpoint could it be reasonably suggested that resentment and disharmony 
would not be the result? The complexity of the calculations required makes them 
prohibitive from the standpoint of public reason. The conceptual point which Rawls 
wishes to make, presumably, that comprehensive doctrines can strengthen public reason, 
is muddied by his historical example.  
     Moreover, from a Rawlsian standpoint it is difficult to see how a legitimate 
conception of public reason could even have existed. According to Rawls, public reason 
is based on certain substantive conceptions of the person implicit in the public culture of 
a liberal democracy. On his view we accept his account of public reason in part because 
we share his intuitions about the nature of moral persons.40 However, in its broadest sense 
the Civil War was fought over the meaning of the word "person". Because the meaning of 
"person" was controversial there could have been no sense in which a legitimate 
conception of public reason could have been appealed to.  
     Further, in this context, the position which won the day had its origin in the extremist 
views of abolitionist William Garrison. Neither Rawls nor Sandel gives an adequate 
account of the relative roles of Garrison and Lincoln. While Sandel is right to note that 
the free labour movement found Garrison's views too radical, he underplays Garrison's 
contribution. George Fredrickson offers a more judicious appraisal. Noting that 
Garrison's extremism isolated him on the far left of the anti-slavery movement, and that, 
therefore, he did not lead the political assault, Fredrickson states: "Nevertheless, he 
remains, and deservedly so, the central figure in the crusade against slavery."41 Though 
Sandel is correct that Garrison's extremism alienated many, Fredrickson states: "his 
primacy as instigator of the movement was unchallenged, and he continued, up to the 
                                                
39 Michael Sandel, "Political Liberalism" (Review), Harvard Law Review, v.107 (May, 1994) pp. 1791-2. 
40 Rawls 1993: 18-19,192. 
41 Fredrickson 1988: 73. 
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time of emancipation, to play an indispensable role as a moral gadfly, keeping the ideal 
ever in the sight of those engaged in confronting, the actual."42 Likewise, C. Vann 
Woodward, indicates Garrison's importance: "History supports Garrisonian dogma ... that 
to be effective the eradication of slavery had to be root-and-branch, that the racist 
ideology supporting it permeated the country, and that abolishing slavery in alliance with 
racists and without eradicating their ideology would be largely an empty victory."43 
Garrison's zealous refusal to compromise with the "practical realities" of his time 
distinguishes his position from that of Lincoln.44  
     Further, while Sandel's characterization of Lincoln's "non-neutrality" is convincing, he 
neglects the implicit neutrality of Lincoln's position on the issue of White supremacy. On 
Lincoln's view, the state did not have a role in correcting the moral views of White 
supremists. While Garrison attacked colonization, Lincoln favoured colonization, 
bracketing the problem of racism, so to speak, by separating the races.45 Thus, Lincoln's 
view, by contrast with Garrison's, did not permit Blacks to participate in American 
political life and allows no fundamental correction of racism.  
     Moreover, Sandel underplays the inconsistency and fundamental danger of Lincoln's 
position. In his 1854 Peoria speech,for example, Lincoln is caught in a dilemma between 
his moral position and his practical position.46 According to Lincoln, slavery is opposed 
to the Declaration of Independence because it permits men to be governed without 
consent. However, he is willing to compromise this position because he cannot admit the 
practical possibility of social and political equality between Blacks and Whites.  
     Harry Jaffa argues that Lincoln accepted the political inequality of Blacks because his 
fellow countrymen judged it necessary to the security of their rights, and the Declaration 
of Independence granted them the right to judge of this security.47 But if slavery itself can 
be judged practically necessary to the security of White rights, it remains possible that the 
extension of slavery can likewise be judged necessary. While Lincoln argues against the 
moral basis for the extension of slavery, he leaves room for an argument for extension 
based on necessity.48 In certain respects then, Garrison's outlook was more republican 
than Lincoln's in that he demanded equal participation for Blacks and argued for the 
correction of racist attitudes.  
                                                
42 Fredrickson 1988: 75. 
43 Quoted in James P. Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism: The Troubled Odyssey of the Liberal 
Idea (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) p. 122. 
44 It should be noted however, that while Garrison's zealotry can be distinguished from Lincoln's cautious 
practicality, he praised Lincoln's refusal to compromise on slavery in the Territories and also urged support 
of Lincoln's war effort. Cf. James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in 
the Civil War and Reconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) pp. 31,55. 
45 In George Fredrickson's characterization, Lincoln was: "a pragmatic White supremacist in his concept of 
domestic race relations but indulged a principled egalitarianism in his world outlook." Fredrickson 1988: 
66. 
46 Cf. Basler 1981: 304. 
47 Harry Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday, 1959) pp. 48-49. 
48 Cf. also Fredrickson 1988: 67. 
PEDDLE:  LIBERALISM, REPUBLICANISM AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS: A CRITIQUE OF SANDEL
 
 177 
     Garrison's moralism makes a particularly unhappy companion for Rawls. As Sandel 
notes, the abolitionists wanted to extend the reach of religious reasoning to other 
political-moral issues. This is inadmissible according to Rawlsian strictures on public 
reasoning - Garrison's radical Protestantism would conflict with other comprehensive 
views. Rawls, then, can claim neither Garrison nor Lincoln as a supporter of public 
reason: Garrison's extreme comprehensive view cannot be the basis for consensus and 
Lincoln's view excludes Blacks from political participation.49 Hence, Rawls must deny 
that his political conception can account for the justness of abolitionist actions or must 
broaden his conception of public reason.  
     This indicates a further weakness in Rawls's conception of public reason. Rawls's 
reference to the Civil War points to a deeper historical relationship between 
comprehensive doctrines and public reason than he can account for. The form of public 
reason current in the United States has its genesis in the zealous assertion of 
comprehensive doctrines in the public realm. But as we have seen these assertions are not 
compatible with the Rawlsian conception of public reason. The difficulty is that Rawls's 
view cannot account for the conditions in the public culture required to ensure the 
existence of public reason. In the United States public reason is parasitic on 
comprehensive views of equality and freedom. While Sandel draws attention to the 
importance of comprehensive doctrines in American history, his one-sided focus on 
republicanism distorts the complex dialectic of the public political culture of the United 
States.  
 
II. The Republican Vision And The New Deal  
     The Lincoln-Douglas debates are thus an instructive example of the limits of neutralist 
dogma. Still the twin defeat of voluntarism and neutrality in the Civil War was not final. 
As noted above, the free labour criticism of slavery shares with republicanism an 
opposition to the dependence slavery creates. Further, both conceive the wage system 
characteristic of capitalism as similarly destructive of independence. However, the 
revolutionary republicanism of the Civil War, based in part on a conception of freedom 
as self-government, cleared the way for a capitalist revolution whose voluntarist ideology 
was antithetical to republicanism. As Sandel states: "Abraham Lincoln turned the 
aspirations of the labourer into a critique of the South ... But the Union victory in the war 
put to rest the threat to free labour posed by slave power, only to revive and intensify the 
threat posed by the wage system of industrial capitalism."50  
                                                
49 It should be noted that abolitionism came in many forms. James M. McPherson identifies three major 
groups: Garrisonians, evangelicals, and political abolitionists. It is arguable that Garrisonians had the most 
effect of these three. Cf. James M. McPherson 1975, The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the 
NAACP (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 4. Also cf. Fredrickson 1988: 73-80.  
50 Sandel 1996: 183. 
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     However, Sandel does not attend sufficiently to the complex dialectic evinced by these 
events. The victory of republicanism in the constitutional sphere opened the door to the 
victory of liberal capitalism in the economic sphere. Further, with the withdrawal of the 
Union army in 1877 and the decision in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), many of the 
advances made in terms of Black independence were destroyed. And yet, one of the 
results of federal non-intervention and neutrality in terms of the problems of race has a 
distinctively republican cast: an increase in national civic participation by southern 
Whites. The importance of this result for national unity should not be underestimated, 
though in the absence of state and federal commitment to Black rights, this dispersal to 
the states of power over race relations was in many ways disastrous for Blacks.  
     This section gives a brief and highly selective account of how capitalism which 
flourished with the destruction of slavery was appropriated as justification for racist 
ideology. On the one hand, it supports Sandel's claims about the limits of voluntarism and 
a `neutralist marketplace' vis-a-vis the civic morality of citizens; on the other, contra 
Sandel, it provides a context which helps situate the republican elements of the New 
Deal.  
1. Background to the New Deal: Capitalism and Racism 
     Though the growth of capitalism has substantial roots in the elimination of slavery it 
was not itself inimical to racism.51 Herbert Spencer's intellectual legitimation of laissez-
faire, voluntarist capitalism dealt a severe blow to Black participation in American civil 
life. In the thirty years after the Civil War it was impossible to be involved in the 
intellectual world without coming to terms with Spencer's views which, prior to 
Darwinism, applied the concepts of survival of the fittest and natural selection to the 
social-economic realm. Richard Hofstadter states: "Herbert Spencer whose evolutionary 
philosophy glorified automatic progress, who threw all his authority into support of the 
thesis that natural economic processes must be allowed to go on without hindrance from 
reforms was idolized in the United States."52 Spencer sanctioned only those state 
functions acceptable to classical liberals, basically those of the nightwatchman state. As 
Young states, Spencer was opposed to: "poor" laws, state support for education, tariffs, 
state banking, sanitary supervision, government postal systems, and even protection 
against medical quacks.53 This prototypical Darwinism legitimized not only the 
                                                
51 There are at least four reasons why the destruction of slavery removed a major bulwark against industry. 
(1) Because slaves were not compensated for their labours, slavery generated relatively low consumer 
demand, as slaves could not be consumers. (2) Slavery, obviously, lacked capitalism's means for 
engendering a work ethic in labourers Cf. James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old 
South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)p. 102. (3) As James Young states: "The defining characteristic 
of capitalism was the separation of the labourers from the means of production and the attendant 
transformation of labour into a commodity" (Young 1996: 112). In the absence of this separation there was 
no market for free labour in the south. (4) As land grew scarce, it became explicit that wage labour was 
more consistent with liberalism than was the free labour ideal which depended on the availability of land. 
52 Hofstadter 1948: 168. 
53  Spencer's views were widely disseminated by his most important American disciple among the 
intelligentsia, William Graham Sumner. Young 1996: 130-1.               
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accumulation of wealth by those at the top of the economic order and its resultant 
privilege but also the appropriateness of the status of those on the bottom: the Blacks. 
With this "scientific" doctrine of White supremacy the ideology of the South had, in a 
sense, become the ideology of the nation.  
     This shared racist ideology was an important aspect of the reintegration of the South 
into the Union. Reintegration was furthered by the non-interventionist stance of the 
federal government. The Civil War had been fought primarily to secure the stability of 
the United States, to unify diverse states under one federal constitution. Northern victory 
saved the Union but only through the use of force, with the result that although the states 
were unified, southerners resented the destruction of their wealth and institutions. Ralph 
Henry Gabriel captures the post-war spirit: "After Appomattox, however, the North and 
South had different traditions, personified by different heroes. Chancellorsville and 
Gettysburg had opposite meanings in Wisconsin and Alabama. Wartime emotionalism 
persisted, moreover, in a hatred that was slow to die."54 Resentment was heightened by 
Reconstruction which asserted the federal government's power to determine the legal 
framework of race relations: southern intransigence was inevitable in the face of the 
measures enforced by the United States. Gabriel makes the interesting point that the 
federal government's retreat from intervention was crucial to the re-emergence of 
southern loyalty to the Union. In 1877 the army was withdrawn. Further, the decision in 
the Civil Rights cases of 1883 limited the power of congress to interfere in state matters, 
and in consequence gave the states power over race relations, subject only to the 
limitation that slavery not be reestablished. Gabriel states: "In 1883, only eighteen years 
after the surrender of Lee, the Court accepted Calhoun's principle that the disposition of 
the race problem should be denied to the central government and be left to the local 
community."55 This sense of sovereignty over the issue of race restored the relationship of 
the South as a sovereign state to the Constitution and contributed greatly to national 
unity.  
     The obvious limit of reunification and the reemergence of Southern loyalty, however, 
was that it rendered Blacks second class citizens. While reunification helped reestablish 
the patriotic unity among states, it infringed the universality of the rights of the citizen. 
But the federal government's retreat from intervention was markedly different from its 
initial neutrality on the slavery issue. Though the federal government withdrew from 
interference in race matters, slavery was abolished and the supremacy of the Union had 
been demonstrated by victory in the Civil War. Whereas secession, which attempted to 
prevent federal intervention, originated with the southern states, the removal of the Union 
Army in 1877 originated with a victorious federal government which had proven its 
authority. The sense of sovereignty over race matters thus drew the South back into the 
Union and though the race problem still existed, there had been progress in the lives of 
Black citizens and secession was no longer a viable answer.  
                                                
54 . Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (New York: Ronald Press 
Company, 1956) p. 141. 
55 Gabriel 1956: 142. 
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     This brief sketch indicates the difficulty in radically separating the republican and 
liberal moments in American history. The interventionist policy characteristic of 
Reconstruction politics usurped the sovereignty of states and thus seems problematic in 
republican terms. While on the one hand, its substantive commitment to the dignity and 
humanity of Blacks secures the integrity of Black communities, on the other, its focus on 
civil rights infringes the republican interest in localized power. The federal neutrality on 
the question of race, characteristic of Redemption policy, and supported by Spencerian 
laissez faire ideology, permits state control of matters of race and is consistent with the 
republican interest in the dispersal of sites of sovereignty. Yet, in this context, neutrality 
is destructive of the civil rights of Blacks and of the strength of Black communities. A 
linear account of American history is thus inadequate to the complexities of concrete 
events. Further, this practical and theoretical nexus of capitalism and racism is a crucial 
background condition without which one's understanding of the New Deal remains 
incomplete.  
     The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus saw the perpetuation of the 
doctrine of White supremacy in the United States and in its highest office.56 But Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt's second New Deal marked a significant transformation of Black 
participation in the public political culture of the United States. Contrary to Sandel's 
portrayal, the New Deal is, in principle and in practice, consistent with the republican 
interest in a politics of the common good, institutional reform, the correction of 
voluntarism and civic participation.57 Recognition of the continuing presence of both 
liberal and republican moments in the history of the United States allows for a more 
comprehensive account of its public culture and strengthens the basis on which Sandel 
can refer to republicanism as a possible enrichment of American political life.  
2. Keynes and the New Deal  
     Sandel focuses on the Keynesianism of the New Deal. He argues that there are three 
essential aspects to the economic philosophy which underlies the New Deal: (1) the 
acceptance of consumption as the basis of political identity and economic policy; (2) the 
rejection of any attempt on the part of government to form or educate individual desires 
and; (3) the "embrace of the voluntarist conception of freedom and the conception of 
persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their ends for themselves."58 
Moreover, he states: "From the late 1930s to the early 1960s, Keynesian fiscal policy 
appealed to policy makers as a way of avoiding the intractable controversies among 
                                                
56 Teddy Roosevelt emphasized the racial inferiority of Blacks. In fact the 1913-14 congress enacted the 
most racist legislation in its history. Woodrow Wilson would not publicly denounce lynching and refused 
to appear at any Negro school or conference. Harding descried racial amalgamation as an impossibility. 
Coolidge did absolutely nothing to assist Blacks. Hoovers legacy is perhaps best described By Chief Justice 
Taft who confided that Hoover aimed: "to break up the solid south and to drive the Negroes out of 
Republican politics." Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National 
Issue, Volume I: The Depression Decade, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) pp. 18-28. 
57 C. Vann Woodward notes this as the foundation of what he calls the second reconstruction. Gunnar 
Myrdal contends: "this changed the whole configuration of the Negro problem." Sitkoff 1978, 58. 
58 Sandel 1996: 267. 
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advocate of various reforms and spokesmen for various sectors of the economy."59 Thus 
for Sandel, the New Deal is a decisive phase in the the development of the procedural 
republic.  
     However, Sandel's account of the New Deal is one-sided. There are explicit republican 
elements in the New Deal which he ignores. A consideration of Keynes's social-political 
philosophy indicates its compatibility with civic republicanism. First it is not clear that 
for Keynes "consumption is the sole end of economic activity".60 Keynes argues, for 
example, that once humans are securely employed in the economic realm, they will be 
freer to pursue what he called the highest objects of life: love, beauty, truth, timeless 
contemplation, and the pursuit of knowledge.61 We shall have, he states: "most sure and 
certain principles of religion and traditional virtue. We shall value ends above means."62 
In fact, Keynes conceived the whole economy as directed to a common good. He states: 
"The state is a sovereign body of which the purpose is to promote the greatest good of the 
whole."63 On this basis, Keynes wanted to prevent market forces from interfering with 
what is fit and proper in the interests of social stability and social justice.64 And he argues, 
for example, that savings and loans should not: "be left entirely to the chances of private 
judgments and private profits."65 Therefore, it is arguable that Keynes conceived distinct 
limits to individualism and voluntarism. Second, while a self-proclaimed conservative on 
certain matters, there are, contrary to Sandel's suggestion, important institutional reforms 
which Keynes believed necessary. Principally he argued for: (1) a central institution to 
control currency and credit; (2) the regulation of savings and investment and; (3) the 
control of population size. Finally, Keynes thought that the economy required communal 
and moral direction. He states: "What we need is the restoration of right moral thinking, a 
return to proper moral values in our social philosophy."66 He envisioned the control of 
investment by a group of public spirited disinterested individuals.67 Further, he thought 
that: "Planning should take place as much as possible in a community in which as many 
people as possible share your own moral position."68 Thus Keynesianism is, in principle, 
more conducive to a republican sense of community than Sandel allows.69  
                                                
59 Sandel 1996: 263. 
60 Sandel 1996: 268. 
61 Allan Meltzer, Keynes's Monetary Theory: A Different Interpretation (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) p. 34. 
62 Quoted in Meltzer 1990: 36. 
63 Quoted in Meltzer 1990: 59. 
64 Meltzer 1990: 36-7. 
65 Quoted in Meltzer 1990: 38. 
66 Quoted in Meltzer 1990: 37. 
67 Meltzer 1990: 10. 
68 Quoted in Meltzer 1990: 38. 
69 Further, Sandel and Keynes have a similar conception of the role of ideas. Early in Democracy's 
Discontent Sandel states: "Political institutions are not simply instruments that implement ideas 
independently conceived; they are themselves embodiments of ideas." (Sandel 1996: ix) Compare Keynes's 
suggestion at the end of The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money: "the ideas of economists 
and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is 
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3. The New Deal and the Regulation of Choice 
     By contrast with Sandel's portrayal, Roosevelt's New Deal is in certain ways a 
correction of voluntarism. Government and politics were seen to play an essential role in 
the economy, to be a correction of laissez-faire. In 1941 Roosevelt states: "The liberal 
party is a party which believes that as new conditions and problems arise beyond the 
power of men and women to meet as individuals it becomes the duty of government to 
find new remedies with which to meet them."70 While Sandel is correct that one of the 
goals of the New Deal was to secure freedom of choice for consumers, there was likewise 
a clear sense of the limits of mere choice. As James Young states: "By the time the 
reform impulse was exhausted in the early days of Roosevelt's second term, the relation 
of the U.S. government to the society and the economy had been transformed. A welfare 
program that emphasized work over the dole was established. There were extensive new 
regulations covering the banking and securities industries. In one way or another, 
industry was also widely regulated. Unemployment and wages-and-hours legislation were 
passed, and the social security system was established."71 Though the reform phase of the 
New Deal ended, it is thus arguable that it accomplished lasting and important changes 
and a context in which voluntarism and self-interest can be regulated. Ralph Henry 
Gabriel makes a similar point, arguing that Roosevelt emphasized both a new and an 
older conception of the free individual. Gabriel contends that the Wagner Act vastly 
strengthened unions giving protection to collective bargaining.72 Collective action is 
sanctioned for the protection of worker-consumers. However, he also indicates that in the 
New Deal agricultural policy, the Jeffersonian theory of individualism prevailed. Gabriel 
notes two specific measures in support of his view: "(1) the limiting of benefits going to 
any one enterprise and (2) the upholding of the established limitation of farms in irrigated 
areas to one hundred sixty acres."73 These measures gave preference to small farms, as 
opposed to corporate farms and they supported the independence of the individual 
farmer. This interest in independent farmers cannot adequately be described in voluntarist 
terms. For the voluntarist it makes no difference whether one is employed by a 
corporation or on one's own farm.  
4. The New Deal and Black Civic Engagement  
     In terms of Black rights, the New Deal was anything but neutral. Its economic 
interventionism was extremely controversial in the South. Moreover, it marked a 
significant improvement in the lives of Black citizens. Sandel contends that the Civil 
Rights movement of the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties was in essence a republican 
movement. He states: "To assimilate the Civil Rights movement to the liberalism of the 
                                                
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else." John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory 
of Employment Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1935) p. 383. 
70 Quoted in Young 1996: 170-71. 
71 Young 1996: 169-170. 
72 Gabriel 1956: 433. 
73 Against the Central Valley Reclamation Project which wanted the removal of this limit. Gabriel 1956: 
433. 
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procedural republic is to miss its most important lessons for our time. More than a means 
to equal rights, the movement itself was a moment of empowerment, an instance of the 
civic strand of freedom."74 By contrast with Sandel's account, however, the civic strand of 
the Civil Rights movement was profoundly influenced by the civic strand of the New 
Deal. To accept the republican nature of the struggle of Martin Luther King and the 
SCLC is to accept the republican influence of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.75 
The New Deal opened the door to the Civil Rights movement.76 By contrast with Sandel's 
focus on the neutrality of the second New Deal and its preference for the spending 
solution over "drastic institutional reforms", the second New Deal was more controversial 
than the first, with regard both to institutional reform and to civil rights. Initially the New 
Deal had little to do with race and did little to change the status of Black citizens. FDR 
did not want to jeopardize economic bills required for national recovery and thus, in 
order to placate Southern interests, he could not defy the southern dominated congress on 
racial matters and capitulated to their resistance to programs which would jeopardize 
their control of southern political and economic policy. Sitkoff states: "The leadership 
elites in Dixie looked askance at new federal programs that reduced dependency and 
paternalism in their domains, raised wages, aided the labour movement, skirted local 
government, and extended the New Deal to those indigents previously unassisted."77  
     To justify their resistance to the New Deal, southern politicians criticized its 
interference in race matters. The New Deal's support for Blacks was intolerable to 
southern prejudice. Southerners argued that the New Deal was an attempt to overturn 
White supremacy, and in the North White supremacy thus became explicitly aligned with 
conservative economic policies which were now out of vogue.78 This relationship 
between economic reform and civil rights reform was made explicit with the result that 
Southern Democrats supportive of the New Deal were edged towards concern with Black 
issues.79 Further, federal intervention which began as economic reform turned back 
judicial precedents such as Slaughterhouse and Cruickshank, as the Roosevelt-stacked 
Court broadened the regulatory powers of the national government.80 As Sitkoff states: 
                                                
74 Sandel 1996: 348. 
75 The SCLC refers to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 
76 It is important to keep in mind the extraordinary influence of Eleanor Roosevelt. Long before the 
Roosevelt administration adopted serious policies for the improvement of the lives of black citizens, she 
kept the black voice alive in the halls of government and in the press. Cf. Sitkoff 1978: 59-62. 
77 Sitkoff 1978: 102. 
78 This mirrors the alignment of White supremacy and laissez-faire capitalism found in Spencerian views 
79 For a detailed analysis of this development and the rift it caused in the Democratic Party cf. Sitkoff 1978: 
102-138. The growing importance of the Black vote enabled Roosevelt to survive this rift. Sitkoff 1978: 
84-101.  
80 In the Slaughterhouse Cases some butchers claimed that a Louisiana law which granted a monopoly on 
the slaughtering business violated their Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The Supreme Court rejected their 
claim because such a precedent would "fetter and degrade State governments ... in the exercise of powers 
heretofore universally conceded to them." (Slaughterhouse Cases 83 U.S. 36,78 (1873). In Cruikshank the 
Supreme Court dismissed nearly 100 indictments against Whites involved in the Colfax Massacre arguing 
that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized no power for Congress to enact: "laws for the suppression of 
ordinary crime within the States.... That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains 
there." United States v. Cruickshank 23 U.S. 710 (1876). 
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"The growing acceptance of the idea that the federal government had the right and the 
duty to intervene on behalf of the economic well-being of its citizens led to the corollary 
that the federal government had the obligation to protect the lives and constitutional 
rights of the Afro-Americans"81  
     Crucial to this reform and to the advancement of Black rights was what Sitkoff calls 
the federalization of the Bill of Rights. Whereas the Slaughterhouse cases in 1879 had 
relegated the protection of civil rights to the states and the Civil Rights Acts of 1883 had 
ended federal enforcement of the 14th Amendment, the decision in the Scottsboro case 
marked the first time in the twentieth century that the Supreme Court asserted its power 
to supervise the enforcement of justice to Blacks in the states by investigating the 
evidence of discrimination itself.82 Likewise, in a footnote to the 1938 opinion in 
Carolene Products, Harlan Stone highlighted the Court's direction by asserting that laws 
involving the bill of rights required more exacting judicial scrutiny.83 Further, in Lane v. 
Wilson 1939, the Court invalidated Oklahoma's attempt to keep the grandfather clause. 
Judge Frankfurter states that the Fifteenth Amendment: "nullified sophisticated as well as 
simpleminded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which 
effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the coloured race although the abstract 
right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race."84 As Sitkoff notes, this asserted that: 
"the Court would look beyond the letter of the law to ferret out discrimination."85 
Whereas the separate but equal doctrine was consistent with the Bill of Rights in theory, 
in practice it was the basis of racial oppression. The interventionist, non-proceduralist 
approach of the Roosevelt Court signalled the demise of Plessy v. Ferguson and its 
separate but equal philosophy.86 Thus by contrast with Sandel's view, dramatic 
institutional reform was an important facet of the New Deal, as the federal government 
asserted its authority in both the economic and racial jurisdiction of the South. Moreover, 
the New Deal was concerned not just with fairness of procedure but with the practical 
outcomes for citizens.  
     The reform of the laissez-faire economy likewise reveals a substantive interest, 
especially in relation to the status of Black citizens. The New Deal originated, of course, 
in response to the massive unemployment and financial chaos brought on by the collapse 
                                                
81 Sitkoff 1978: 272. 
82 Nevertheless as Sitkoff points out the distance to be travelled was apparent in that on the same day the 
Court unanimously upheld the right of a political party to White-only primaries. Sitkoff 1978: 328. 
83 Here the Supreme Court upheld a federal law which banned interstate commerce in adulterated milk 
declaring that regulations affecting ordinary commercial transactions would be presumed constitutional as 
long as it had a rational foundation. In his famous footnote he indicated grounds for expanding judicial 
review. Carolene Products Company v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) Cf. also Sandel 1996: 
47. 
84 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
85 Sitkoff 1978: 237. 
86 In Plessy v. Ferguson, Homer Plessy sued a New Orleans railroad which forced him to leave a Whites-
only car. He argued that segregation was illegal under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
decision established the separate-but-equal doctrine ruling that separation of the races is within the bounds 
of the Constitution so long as equal accommodations are made for Blacks. Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) 
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of industry and the economic system during the Great Depression. Left to itself, the free 
play of individual interest produced an inherently unstable economy with dramatic effects 
on the political and socio-economic lives of all citizens. One could no longer have faith in 
the combination of laissez-faire and survival of the fittest to provide a workable social 
order. Both rich and poor were devastated by the economic collapse. The depression 
marked a practical demonstration that laissez-faire capitalism was not a natural order, 
success in which was a measure of the virtue of citizens; even those who were successful 
and were judged to be the fittest suffered during the depression. By contrast with the 
Spencerian laissez-faire hierarchy of race, the New Deal implicitly recognized a 
universality of suffering; all humans, black and white, were thought to have the same 
needs. Sandel characterizes the Civil Rights movement as a moment of self-government 
and civic engagement; the active participation of Blacks in their own political fate. It is 
undeniable, however, that the New Deal saw significant advances in Black participation 
in government. Sitkoff contends that the Works Progress Administration, for example, 
made Blacks feel included.87 He quotes a Black respondent in an interview with Studs 
Terkel: "It made us feel like there was something we could do in the scheme of things."88 
Not only did the WPA empower individual Blacks but it was central to the survival of 
Black communities, rivalling agriculture and domestic labour as the main source of 
income for Blacks.89 Moreover the WPA Education Program taught almost two hundred 
and fifty thousand Blacks to read and write. The Federal Music Project and the Federal 
Theatre Project conserved and enhanced Black culture by recording and publishing Black 
folk music, holding music classes for Blacks and employing Blacks in the production of 
dramas which portrayed the lives of Nat Turner, Harriet Tubman, Pierre Toussaint. 
Further, as Gunnar Myrdal argues, the tripling of Blacks in the civil service (mostly in the 
lower ranks) and the appointment of over one hundred Blacks to administrative positions 
were "the first significant step toward the participation of Negroes in federal government 
activity."90 The Black Cabinet also raised the level of Black participation and interest in 
government by initiating Blacks into the maze of civil service organizations and by 
initiating an end to discriminatory hiring by civil agencies.91  
     Increased political participation significantly strengthened the power of the Black 
vote. In 1934, the vision among the Black leadership of the Black vote as a "balance of 
power" was becoming a reality as a majority of Blacks voted Democrat for the first time, 
thus switching allegiance from the GOP.92 No longer hamstrung by devotion to the 
Republican party, Black voters would now be courted by both parties. A quotation from a 
Time article of 1936 is indicative of growing Black influence: "In no national election 
                                                
87 This sense of inclusion grew when Roosevelt issued Executive Order 7046 which stipulated that there 
shall be no discrimination between otherwise qualified workers in the WPA. Discrimination persisted, but 
the number of Blacks on relief and the money they earned increased. Sitkoff 1978: 69. 
88 Sitkoff 1978: 70. 
89 Sitkoff 1978: 71. 
90 Sitkoff 1978: 76. 
91 The Black Cabinet is the name the press gave to The Federal Council of Negro Affairs. It was composed 
of many young college educated Blacks and veterans of the civil rights movement. They focussed 
government interest in civil rights. Cf. Sitkoff 1978: 78-9. 
92 Sitkoff 1978: 89. 
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since 1860 have politicians been so Negro minded as in 1936."93 Further, grassroots 
protest indicates the growing activity of Blacks in American public political life.94 
Perhaps the most significant protest march, however, was one that didn't take place: the 
proposed March-on-Washington.95 Sitkoff states: "More than any other single leader, 
organization, or event, Randolph's electrifying effort in behalf of the March-on-
Washington catalyzed the supporters of civil rights into a mass movement that could not 
be ignored."96 Randolph's militancy brought a radical edge to the Black Civil Rights 
movement which mobilized Blacks to a greater degree than the gradualism of the 
NAACP. His efforts legitimized a more combative approach to civil rights matters and 
gave rise to a more aggressive Black leadership.97  
     By contrast to Sandel's view, then, the voluntarism of the New Deal did not exclude a 
republican interest in civic engagement and the common good. The republican moment 
of American politics thus extends well into the twentieth century and the New Deal 
cannot be adequately characterized as a decisive moment in "the victory of the procedural 
republic".  
 
Conclusion 
     By contrast to the one-sided approaches of Sandel and Rawls, recognition of the dual 
moments of American public political life is important both historically and normatively. 
Sandel has an almost Whiggish conception of American history. He portrays this history 
as a decline from first principles, the gradual subordination of republicanism to liberalism 
as the official public political doctrine. The result of this decline, on his view, is a public 
life devoid of the civic virtues required to maintain an adequate sense of community. He 
looks to the redemption of this fragmented and discontented public life in a retrieval of 
republican-communitarian first principles. Rawls, by contrast, has an almost 
"Progressive" view, according to which the key to the stability of American public life 
consists not in a return to a republican notion of civic virtue but rather in the continuance 
of liberal tradition. Implicit in Rawls's sketchy account of liberal history is the view that 
this history is the development of a common public life made possible by the overcoming 
                                                
93 Sitkoff 1978: 91. Cf. Time, vol XXVIII (Aug 127, 1936) p. 10. 
94 Protests against decisions in the Scottsboro and Herndon cases, and against the eviction of Blacks in 
Chicago unified Whites and Blacks under the aegis of the communist party. A banner at a funeral 
procession for Blacks killed in a protest over the evictions read: "NEGRO AND WHITE WORKERS 
UNITE TOGETHER". Sitkoff 1978: 154. 
95 In response to the exclusion of Blacks from the defence program, the idea of a march on Washington was 
raised at a meeting of various civil rights groups in Chicago. From the early estimates of between five and 
ten thousand marchers, by June, A. Philip Randolph was predicting one hundred thousand protesters. In the 
face of this threatened march, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 which put into effect an end to 
discrimination in defence agencies. In return the march was cancelled. But the result of the political force 
which secured Roosevelt's capitulation went far beyond the executive order. Sitkoff 1978: 316. 
96 Sitkoff 1978: 316. 
97 Sitkoff 1978: 333. 
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of sectarian comprehensive differences. All that is required, then, to secure the stability of 
the liberal state is for citizens to accept common non-comprehensive criteria for public 
political discussion. On his view, citizens must agree to use public reason in their 
political debates, to accept political criteria for the solution of political disputes.  
     Both of these accounts are inadequate to the public political culture of America. First, 
American history cannot adequately be described as the progressive victory of neutrality. 
Secondly, its public life can be invigorated neither by a return to a republican sense of 
participation through the dispersal of sites of sovereignty nor by the acceptance of an 
overlapping consensus on a political conception of the state. American history suggests 
instead that republicanism and liberalism exist in a continuous dialectic with each other. 
The Lincoln-Douglas debates and the Civil War exhibit a conflicting mixture of these 
moments. Civil conflict was engendered by a division between the constitutional 
assertion of the universal rights of the citizen and sovereign southern states whose 
culture, founded on slavery, denied this universality on the basis of race. The public 
culture was torn between respect for the cultural integrity of the south, instantiated in the 
Constitution, and a sense of the inadequacy of slavery to the concept of freedom 
underlying the Constitution. Post Civil-War America attempted to reconstruct southern 
culture in terms of the new reality of emancipation. But the protection of individual rights 
could not transform the racism of southern communities. Federal intervention in the 
protection of Black rights was anathema to southern interests which traditionally had 
authority over race relations. The dispersal of power in the removal of troops and the 
reemergence of southern sovereignty over race, while respectful of southern 
communities, was disastrous for Black rights: Jim Crow laws everywhere infringed the 
spirit if not the letter of the Constitution.  
     The federalization of the Bill of Rights, which begins with the New Deal and 
culminates in the Civil Rights movement of the sixties, represents a very determinate 
unification of the liberal and republican moments of the American polis. Beginning with 
a concern with the universal reality of need, with the vast human suffering caused by the 
Great Depression, the New Deal moved to a concern with universal rights. To satisfy 
needs and rights it adopted a consumerist ideology and upheld the rights of Black 
individuals, for example, against southern states but it also bolstered communities and 
encouraged participation in self- government. The New Deal promoted a role for 
government beyond the protection of individual interest as expressed in a laissez-faire 
economy. Over and against the proceduralism and contractualism of the Lochner court, it 
looked to transform the conditions of the working lives of citizens, recognizing that real 
freedom is more than the choice to sign a contract. The New Deal promoted a sense of 
the national American community inclusive of Blacks and Whites and asserted the role of 
this national community in regulating and correcting the choices of consumers in the 
market-place.  
     Sandel thus misses an opportunity to draw on the substantive moment of the New 
Deal, because he adheres to a one-sided account of American history. As a result, his 
suggestion that the malaise in self-government can be rectified by the dispersal of power 
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to smaller sites of sovereignty is only a partial solution. What is further required is the 
education of particular communities to a sense of their basis in human freedom. Unless 
particular communities recognize the universal right of human freedom, the dispersal of 
power will result in prejudiced exclusion of minority groups. Moreover, Sandel is unclear 
as to how exactly a sense of national community will be created from this dispersal. He 
recalls the Tocquevillean view that: "Practising self-government in small spheres impels 
citizens to larger spheres of political activity as well" (Sandel 1996: 347). Exactly how 
this occurs Sandel never elucidates. What needs to be recognized and further explored is 
the way in which the national community already underlies the particular sites of 
sovereignty, and protects them from illegitimate intrusion; how the Black community, for 
example is supported by the liberal interest in the Bill of Rights. Together with the 
recognition of the role of federalism in the lives of particular communities, one must 
acknowledge that legal restraints and protections cannot educate and correct the 
comprehensive moral ideals and prejudices of particular citizens and communities. The 
full enactment of Black civil rights in the south demanded the moral conversion of the 
nation, a response in part to the dignity of Black protest, and Martin Luther King's 
insistent interpretation of the necessary social manifestation of Christianity. So far as 
citizens and communities are racist in their souls, civil rights remains a partial 
accomplishment and the public reason of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus will fail to 
correct their prejudiced comprehensive presuppositions.  
     The union of community and individual, of rights and participation, is already 
implicitly accomplished in the United States, in the public institutions which hold 
together the moments of republicanism and liberalism, for example, in a Congress which 
unifies and differentiates the principles of individual and community (in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate). To overcome the contemporary discontent is not to 
adhere to one side or the other but more clearly to spell out and adhere to their relation. 
Any attempt to conceptualize the ethical spirit which animates the public political culture 
of the United States must articulate both moments: respect for individual rights and the 
integrity of community; respect for the freedom to revise and to participate in self-
government.  
